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Who Cares if it's Open?: Hudson v.
Michigan and the United States Supreme




It is 2:30 a.m. After a long night of tending to your three flu-
stricken children, you and your husband finally have the opportunity to
shower and prepare for bed. Exhaustion washes over you. Settling in for
the evening, you both say your goodnights and peacefully fall asleep.
Some time later, you are abruptly awakened from your slumber. Leaning
up in bed, you think you hear someone outside your home. Suddenly, a
violent crash echoes throughout the house. Dressed in your pajamas, you
and your husband sprint downstairs to unexpectedly greet several
uniformed, armed individuals screaming, "Police! We have a search
warrant!" as they are entering your home. Stunned and embarrassed at
the state of your dress, you try to conceal yourself while your husband
wrangles three ill, frightened children.
Several hours later and frustrated by their fruitless search, the police
leave. Your front door is destroyed, your home in shambles. The police
entered carelessly and with such ferocity that they inadvertently shattered
several antique family heirlooms. You stand there, now wide awake,
thinking to yourself how unnecessary the whole event has been; you
would have gladly opened the door had the officers only asked. Is it
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possible that the police can just break down your door without reason?
Does this not violate your constitutional rights? If you answered yes,
you would have been correct, but that was prior to the 2006 United States
Supreme Court decision in Hudson v. Michigan. '
On August 27, 1998,2 Detroit police officers arrived at Booker T.
Hudson's home to execute a search warrant for drugs and firearms.
3
Announcing their presence, the police waited approximately three to five
seconds before opening the unlocked front door and entering the Hudson
home,4 where they found Hudson lounging in a living room chair.5
Executing the search warrant, police discovered a loaded firearm lodged
within the appellant's chair and large amounts of cocaine both on and
around his person.6 The evidence was taken into custody and Hudson
was charged with illegal cocaine and felonious firearm possession.7
Prior to trial, the state court granted Hudson's motion to suppress the
seized evidence.8 However, the Michigan Court of Appeals soon
reversed the trial court, reinstating the evidence. 9  The Michigan
Supreme Court subsequently declined to review Hudson's appeal and he
was convicted. 0  Evoking the Fourth Amendment again, Hudson
renewed his appeal, only to see the Court of Appeals affirm his
conviction and the Michigan Supreme Court decline review again."
Hudson then sought certiorari. 1
Eviscerating the "knock and announce" rule, the United States
Supreme Court held that when police violate the Fourth Amendment by
failing to announce their presence and authority prior to executing a
search warrant, the exclusionary rule does not apply. 13 According to
Justice Scalia, the suppression of evidence, as a result of a procedural
knock and announce error, is not proper in light of the significant social
consequences associated with such a decision,1 4 the availability of civil
1. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).
2. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006)
(No. 04-1360).
3. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2161.
4. See Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-9, Hudson, 126 S. Ct. 2159
(No. 04-1360) (testimony of Officer Jamal Good).
5. See id. at 9.
6. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2161.
7. Brief of Petitioner at 3, Hudson v. Michigan, No. 04-1360 (Aug. 25, 2005)
[hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
8. Id.
9. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2161.
10. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 7, at 4.
11. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at2161.
12. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 7, at 5.
13. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2170.
14. Id. at 2165-66 (holding that the social costs of exclusion, such as allowing
criminals to go free, are too excessive to substantiate further interaction between the
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remedies' 5 and the attenuated relationship between violation of the knock
and announce rule and the seizure of evidence.'
6
This Comment will examine these arguments and highlight their
weaknesses, provide a history of the knock and announce rule, an
investigation of applicable exclusionary rule cases including those
dealing with its methodical erosion, and discuss the post-Hudson
implications this country will face. In doing so, the Comment will
demonstrate why the marriage between the knock and announce and
exclusionary rules is the only reasonable remedy available to ensure the
protection of Fourth Amendment rights.
I. Background
A. The Knock and Announce Rule
Stemming from the belief that "a man's home is his castle,"' 17 an
English court stipulated that the government must notify a suspect of its
purpose prior to entering his or her home and may only penetrate the
home's boundaries forcibly absent other options.' 8 Incorporating that
value system into this country's laws, the Fourth Amendment has long
guarded the sanctity of the home, one of its most treasured and central
principles.' 9 Under this premise, the Supreme Court has stated that
"physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed ' 20 and that, within the walls of their
homes, American citizens are supposed to live free from "unreasonable
government intrusion.'
As a result, American courts have generally held that the knock and
announce rule requires police to announce their presence prior to forcibly
entering a home, allowing residents the opportunity to cooperate with
law enforcement officials by fostering a peaceful entrance.22 The rule is
knock and announce and exclusionary rules).
15. See id. at 2167 (concluding that civil suits are a strong enough deterrent now that
Congress has "authorized attorney's fees for civil-rights plaintiffs").
16. Id. at 2165.
17. Jennifer M. Goddard, The Destruction of Evidence Exception to the Knock and
Announce Rule: A Call For Protection of Fourth Amendment Rights, 75 B.U. L. REV.
449,453 (1995).
18. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) (citing Semayne's Case, (1603)
77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B.)).
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated ... ").
20. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
21. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
22. See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931-32. Naturally, the first inquiry under this
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based upon at least three rationales. First, the rule protects human life
through the reduction of unannounced entries that may lead to violence
under the mistaken guise of a resident acting in self-defense against an
intruder.23 The second rationale focuses on preventing the destruction of
property by allowing residents to voluntarily open the door, avoiding the
damage typically associated with forcible entry.24 The third rationale
advocates providing residents the opportunity to compose themselves;
championing the preservation of privacy and dignity that a sudden
intrusion may extinguish.25 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not
expressly adopt the knock and announce rule until the late twentieth
century.26
In Wilson v. Arkansas,27 the Supreme Court brought the knock and
announce rule under the purview of the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness inquiry,28 stating that "[there is] little doubt that the
Framers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an
officer's entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in
assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure., 29 The Wilson Court
identified Semayne's Case, a seventeenth century English case, as the
knock and announce rule's common law patriarch.3° Semayne's Case
further explained that the common law principle was initially affirmed
within a thirteenth century statute.3' While the Court relied upon this
jurisprudence is whether a knock and announce violation occurred initially. However,
because the government acknowledged the violation in Hudson, the sole purpose of this
Comment is to argue that such violations are unconstitutional and demand the exclusion
of evidence gathered as a result.
23. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 460-61 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
24. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165 (2006) (quoting Richards v.
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 n.5 (1997)).
25. See id. (concluding that the time between knock and announce and entry will
allow an individual to dress or awaken).
26. See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931-34.
27. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927.
28. Id. at 929.
29. Id. at 934. The common law rule was subsequently granted federal statutory
authority and remains codified today. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 229 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2006) ("[A law enforcement] officer may break open any [door,
window or part of a house] to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority
and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person
aiding him in the execution of the warrant."). The analysis under this codification,
however, mirrors the Fourth Amendment evaluation under similar circumstances. See
United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 33 (2003).
30. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931 (citing Semayne's Case, (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195
(K.B.)) (holding that the sheriff should announce his arrival and request the door be
opened prior to forcibly entering the home).
31. Id. at 932 (citing Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 196) (referring to Statute of
Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 17 (Eng.)).
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historical support to lend credence to the knock and announce rule,32 the
Court also noted that it may not be prudent to apply the rule in all
circumstances.33 However, the Court failed to catalog specific instances
where circumventing the rule would be proper.
34
Soon after Wilson, the Court set out to sculpt the knock and
announce rule. In Richards v. Wisconsin,35 the Court rejected the
establishment of a bright line exemption to the knock and announce
requirement in felony drug prosecutions. 36  Though the Wisconsin
Supreme Court asserted that the inherently dangerous suspects and
crimes involved in felony drug cases create exigent circumstances, 37 the
United States Supreme Court dismissed this argument as an
"overgeneralization" preventing judicial review in drug prosecutions.38
Instead, the Court held that exigent circumstances exist to forgo
knocking and announcing if the police have "reasonable suspicion" that
doing so "would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the
effective investigation of the crime....
One year later, the Court found itself addressing the knock and
announce requirement again.40 In United States v. Ramirez,41 the Court
was confronted with the ramifications of property destruction in no-
knock cases. 42 Executing a no-knock warrant, the police gained entry to
the residence by breaking a window.43 The circuit court held that a
44higher exigency standard is required where property destruction occurs.
The Court, declining to adopt this rule, concluded that reasonable
suspicion is the only justification necessary to execute a no-knock entry
and the destruction of property in no way influences that factor.45 On the
other hand, the Court noted that extreme property damage during entry
may result in a Fourth Amendment violation in spite of an otherwise
lawful entry.46 In the end, Ramirez essentially affirmed the use of a
32. See id. at 931-32.
33. See id. at 935-36 (concluding that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
requirement provided for the possibility of no-knock entries in circumstances where
violence or evidence tampering was likely).
34. See id.
35. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
36. Id. at 396.
37. Id. at 390.
38. Id. at 393.
39. Id. at 394.
40. See United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 70 (1998).
41. 523 U.S. 65.
42. See id. at 69-70.
43. Id. at 65.
44. Id. at 69-70.
45. Id. at 70-71.
46. Id. at 65-66.
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reasonableness test to determine the legitimacy of any claim associated
with the knock and announce rule.47
Finally, in United States v. Banks,48 the last knock and announce
case prior to Hudson, the Court was compelled to determine what test
should be used to ascertain the period of time a law enforcement officer
must wait between announcement and forcible entry. 49 Although, the
circuit court implemented a categorical standard,50 the Court rejected this
approach and reaffirmed the reasonableness standard, concluding that the
fifteen to twenty seconds the officers waited prior to entering was
sufficient, under this case's facts, to permit a forcible breech. 51
The end result is that this jurisprudence does not embrace absolutes.
Reasonable exigent circumstances exist to exempt law enforcement from
52
knocking and announcing in certain circumstances.
B. The Exclusionary Rule-A Corrective Remedy
Proffered by Weeks v. United States,53 the exclusionary rule bars
prosecutors from using evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment in federal criminal trials. 54  Adopted as the principle
deterrent to illegal police conduct,55 the exclusionary rule's ability to
thwart such action is grounded in common sense.56 When the courts
overturn criminal convictions garnered through the use of illegally seized
evidence, law enforcement officers are dissuaded from initiating
unreasonable searches and seizures. 57 In Elkins v. United States,58 the
Court introduced the "imperative of judicial integrity," the premise that
the Court's failure to ban the use of illegally seized evidence from trials
would signal the government's ascension into the role of a "lawbreaker"
and display contempt for the Fourth Amendment. 59 In Mapp v. Ohio,60
47. See id. at 66.
48. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003).
49. See id. at 42.
50. See id. at 34. The categorical approach took into account, among other things,
the size of the residence, the time of day, the crime being investigated and whether entry
sans force was possible. Id. at 34-35.
51. Id.at39-40.
52. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995), see also Banks, 540 U.S. 31;
Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65; Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
53. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
54. See id. at 398 (holding that personal letters obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment could not be admitted at trial and should be returned to their rightful owner).
55. See id. at 392-93 (asserting that courts should not sanction law enforcement
activity violating "fundamental rights" of privacy).
56. See id. at 391-92.
57. See id.
58. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
59. Id. at 222-23. But see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)
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the Court, holding that the exclusionary rule is grounded in the
Constitution, 61 expanded the rule's application, as described in Weeks, to
include state criminal trials via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.62 In doing so, the Court averred that neglecting to
protect against unreasonable actions by all law enforcement officers
would reduce Fourth Amendment safeguards to a "form of words. 63
Recently, in United States v. Espinoza,64 the dissent stressed that courts
should analyze alleged exclusionary violations from the information
available at the moment of breach, ignoring information available in
hindsight.65 These principles, taken together, are considered the essential
elements of the exclusionary rule and the Fourth Amendment rights it
espouses.66
C. Reasonable Limits on the Exclusionary Rule
Though the exclusionary rule was initially viewed as an iron fist
against Fourth Amendment incursions, 67 the majority of post-Mapp
decisions "limit the rule to a 'targeted deterrent remedy for police
illegality.' 68 In Terry v. Ohio69 for example, the Court held that the
exclusionary rule, while necessary, was subject to certain restrictions.7°
According to Chief Justice Warren's opinion, because the rule falls
underneath the Fourth Amendment, and therefore the reasonableness
inquiry, it cannot be used as a blanket measure to disqualify evidence in
(focusing on the deterrence aspect of the exclusionary rule, while largely ignoring the
effect of judicial integrity).
60. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
61. Id. at 656. Contra Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (holding that the
exclusionary rule was created through judicial discretion, not constitutional providence).
62. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660 (holding that it was necessary to extend Fourth
Amendment protections to state actions to prevent the Federal government from illegally
obtaining evidence by proxy).
63. Id. at 655 (explaining that sans constitutional guarantees against unreasonable
searches and seizures, personal liberty and privacy would exist in theory alone).
64. United States v. Espinoza, 256 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2001).
65. Id. at 730-31 (Wood, J. dissenting) ("Normally Fourth Amendment issues are
analyzed on the basis of information available at the time they act ... [and] after-
acquired information about the defendant's alleged criminal activity should not influence
either the scope of the ... Fourth Amendment rights or whether they were violated.").
66. See id.
67. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1914); See Mapp, 367 U.S. at
655.
68. Fourth Amendment-Exclusionary Rule-Seventh Circuit Holds that the
Suppression of Evidence is a Disproportionately Severe Sanction for a Timing Violation
of the Knock and Announce Requirement-United States v. Espionza, 256 F.3d 718 (7th
Cir. 2001), 115 HARV. L. REv. 709, 709 (2001) (citations omitted).
69. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
70. See id. at 13.
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every situation.71  Instead, a case-by-case evaluation is usually
appropriate. 2 The Court went on to assert that, in many instances, the
exclusionary rule would have no effect.73 More importantly perhaps,
Chief Justice Warren provided a window into the exclusionary rule's
future through the belief that "rigid and unthinking application of the
exclusionary rule... may exact a high toll in human injury and
frustration of efforts to prevent crime. 74
In United States v. Calandra,75 the Supreme Court, settling the
aforementioned difference between its Weeks and Wolf decisions,76
determined that exclusion was not constitutionally compelled, but instead
was a third-party remedy designed to deter injury to one's personal right
to privacy, a right the Constitution was not necessarily prepared to
address individually.7 7  This deterrence mechanism is normally
considered general in scope, focusing on law enforcement as a whole
instead of specific acts by individual officers.78
Paying deference to this reasoning, United States v. Leon79 took the
next logical step. 80 Admitting illegally seized evidence, the Court held
that the introduction of this evidence alone does not violate any rights
protected by the Constitution.81  Thus, according to Illinois v. Gates8
whether a police action amounted to a violation of a party's Fourth
Amendment rights is a separate matter from the appropriateness of
71. See id. ("[The rule] cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of
legitimate police investigative techniques on the ground that [the] conduct.., is closely
similar [to other] unwarranted intrusions upon constitutional protections.").
72. See id.
73. Id. at 14 (citing instances such as street encounters or instances where the police
do not intend to prosecute a crime or are willing to sacrifice prosecution to reach another
goal).
74. Id. at 15 (holding that strict adherence to a bright line rule fails to observe the
situational diversity law enforcement officers encounter on a daily basis).
75. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
76. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961). Contra Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 28 (1949).
77. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347-48 ("[T]he [exclusionary] rule is a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.")
(emphasis added). Contra Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651, 657 (holding that the exclusionary rule
is an essential "part and parcel" of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of individual
privacy).
78. See Loly Garcia Tor, Note, Mandating Exclusion for Violations of the Knock and
Announce Rule, 83 B.U. L. REv. 853, 858 (2003) (citing Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1,
10 (1995)).
79. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
80. See id. at 906-08.
81. See id. at 906-07 (concluding that evidence seized through the use of a legal
search warrant later held invalid was admissible because exclusion is not a personal
constitutional right a particular defendant may rely upon).
82. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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invoking the exclusionary rule in a given situation.83 Elaborating further,
the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Stefonek84 held that the
exclusionary rule should be limited to situations in which a constitutional
violation caused actual harm "to the interest ... that the [Constitution is
charged with] protect[ing].,, 85 This Fourth Amendment proportionality
principle is analogous to basic negligence actions in tort. Even in
circumstances involving the most obvious negligent conduct, the
behavior is not actionable unless it causes injury.86
The societal costs of exclusion have become increasingly important
throughout modem Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.87  According to
the Supreme Court in Nix v. Williams,88 the exclusionary rule's ban on
the use of probative evidence deprives courts of the information
necessary to prosecute, punish and deter criminal activity. 89 The rule is
said to stultify what might qualify as legitimate law enforcement
techniques and provide windfalls to guilty defendants via "get out of jail
free cards." 90 In an attempt to counteract this supposed effect, the Court,
adopting the inevitable discovery rule, stipulated that law enforcement
may not be placed in a worse position had the Fourth Amendment
violation not occurred.91 As a result, echoing the harmless-error rule,92
the inevitable discovery rule mandates the admission of evidence that
would have been discovered and seized but-for a procedural error.
93
83. See id. at 223 (citing United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980)); United
States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)).
84. United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir. 1999).
85. Id. at 1036 (expounding upon the belief proportionality should guide the
punishment of a harmful act); see supra note 68, at 710 (citing United States v. Espinoza,
256 F.3d 718, 729 (7th Cir. 2001)).
86. United States v. Salgado, 807 F.2d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing the
relationship between procedural Fourth Amendment violations and subsequent remedies).
Some courts have concluded that the exclusion of probative evidence has evolved into an
obsolete practice in a significant portion of Fourth Amendment violation cases. See
Stefonek, 179 F.3d at 1035-36.
87. See Nix v. Williams, 461 U.S. 431,443-43 (1984).
88. 461 U.S. 431 (1984).
89. See id. at 442-43.
90. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976) (concluding that the exclusionary
rule disproportionately taxes the judiciary's purpose of determining guilt or innocence in
criminal trials).
91. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 443-44 (discussing the symbiotic relationship between the
independent source doctrine and the inevitable discovery rule).
92. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P.
52(a)) ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights
shall be disregarded.").
93. Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-43 ("If the.., information would have been ultimately or
inevitably discovered by lawful means ... the deterrence rationale has so little basis that
the evidence should be [admitted].").
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D. Hudson v. Michigan
1. Majority Opinion
In Hudson, revisiting the knock and announce rule for the first time
since Banks, the Court, in a five-four decision, concluded that evidence
exclusion is not a remedy for knock and announce rule violations.94
Examining the exclusionary rule, Justice Scalia's 95 stated that
"[s]uppression of evidence.., has always been our last resort, not our
first ' 96 and that exclusion is not proper where the Fourth Amendment
violation involved is tenuously connected to the manner in which the
evidence is seized.97 Plainly stated, the Court concluded that knock and
announce violations do not trigger the exclusionary rule because the
evidence obtained subsequent to the violation would have been
discovered anyway, pursuant to the lawful search warrant.98 Even where
the violation is a "but-for" cause of discovering the evidence, invoking
the exclusionary rule may still be inappropriate where "the interest
protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would
not be served by suppression of evidence obtained." 99
The interests served by the knock and announce rule, "the
protection of life and limb ... [and] property" and "privacy and dignity,"
are not safeguarded through exclusion.'0 0  Instead, the Fourth
Amendment is targeted towards protecting "persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures; ' ' a goal served by
"[e]xclusion of... evidence obtained by a warrantless search.... , 1 02
Given that the knock and announce rule is not meant to prevent the
lawful seizure of evidence, and any violation thereof is the result of a
warranted search, suppression does not advocate the requirement's
purposes. 103
The Court emphasized that "the exclusionary rule has never been
applied except 'where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial
social costs.' ' 10 4 Embracing this ideal, the Court stated that maintaining
94. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2170 (2006).
95. Justice Scalia's majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Thomas and Justice Alito. Justice Kennedy joined the opinion as well, except for Part V.
96. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2163.
97. See id. at 2164.
98. See id. at 2164-65.
99. Id. at 2164.
100. Id. at 2165; see supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
101. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
102. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2164.
103. See id. at 2164-65; see also supra text accompanying note 100.
104. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165 (quoting Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v.
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the relationship between the knock and announce and exclusionary rules
only serve to burden courts, through promulgating "a constant flood of
alleged failures to observe the rule."'10 5 Additionally, the Court noted that
excluding evidence as a result of a procedural error was akin to entering
a lottery where "[t]he cost ... would be small, but the jackpot enormous;
suppression of all evidence, amounting in many cases to a get-out-of-jail-
free card." 10 6  Absent a definitive length of time, the police, after
announcing their presence, are required to wait a reasonable interval
before entering a home.10 7 Erring on the side of caution, police delay
warrant execution to avoid exclusion, thereby encouraging evidence
tampering and violence against law enforcement. 10 8  Balancing these
factors, the Court determined that the "substantial social costs" vastly
outweighed the deterrence benefits. 109
Violating the knock and announce rule does not provide police
access to any evidence that does not already fall under the purview of the
search warrant."10 Therefore, ignoring the rule fails to provide police
with any additional benefits, except avoiding violence and the
destruction of evidence, which would already be considered possible
exigent circumstances and exceptions to the knock and announce rule."'
The Court also determined that adequate deterrents already existed
to supplant exclusion in knock and announce cases. 12 Although courts
have largely ignored qualified immunity claims under these
circumstances,1 3 Justice Scalia noted that victims of violations may seek
damages via civil right suits'' 4 and that these suits are a reasonable
method of redress." 15 Moreover, now that positive case dispositions may
entitle plaintiffs to attorney's fees, 1 6 plaintiffs are more likely to find




108. See id. at 2166 (concluding that the knock and announce rule serves no
legitimate function because it only promotes evidence destruction and "life-threatening
resistance ... dangers which, if there is even 'reasonable suspicion' of their existence,




112. See id. at 2166-68.
113. Id. at 2167-68.
114. Id. at 2167; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) ("Every person who, under color of any
State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any.., person... to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding ... ").
115. See Hudson 126 S. Ct. at2167.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006) ("In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision
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qualified counsel, thereby significantly boosting their chance of
success.117 The Court also concluded that the steady increase in law
enforcement professionalism, fostered by heightened training and an
"emphasis on internal police discipline," inevitably reduces the
likelihood of civil rights violations." 18
Concluding the Court's analysis in the plurality portion of the
opinion, Justice Scalia argued that Segura v. United States," 9 New York
v. Harris120 and United States v. Ramirez121 confirm the proposition that
application of the exclusionary rule is inappropriate as a result of a knock
and announce violation. 1
22
2. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Agreeing it was necessary to dissolve the exclusionary and knock
and announce relationship, Justice Kennedy penned a separate opinion to
underscore the importance of the rules individually 1 23 and note that he
was "not convinced" that Segura and Harris have "much relevance"
under these factual circumstances. 1
24
3. Hudson's Scathing Dissent
In a commanding and antagonistic dissent,1 25 Justice Breyer
declared that Hudson represented an explicit betrayal of ancient legal
history and Supreme Court precedent, dramatically reducing the Court's
ability to enforce compliance with the constitutionally required knock
and announce rule. 126 He asserted that:
There may be instances in the law where text or history or tradition
leaves room for a judicial decision that rests upon little more than an
unvarnished judicial instinct. But this is not one of them. Rather, our
of... section[] ... 1983 ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs . .
117. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at2167.
118. Id.at2168.
119. See 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (holding admissible evidence discovered when police
illegally entered a home but postponed the search until a warrant arrived).
120. See 495 U.S. 14 (1990) (reasoning that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable
where the suspect was illegally arrested in his home but later proffered incriminating
statements while in custody).
121. See 523 U.S. 65 (1998) (holding no Fourth Amendment violation present where
evidence was seized as a result of entrance gained by damaging the property).
122. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2168-70 (Scalia, J., plurality).
123. See id. at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
124. Id. at 2171 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
125. Justice Breyer's opinion was joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Souter and
Justice Ginsburg.
126. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2171 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Fourth Amendment traditions place high value upon protecting
privacy in the home.1
27
Scouring the integral decisions which developed the exclusionary
and knock and announce rules, 28 including many of the aforementioned
cases, 129 Justice Breyer argued that "elementary logic" demands
exclusionary rule application in conjunction with knock and announce
violations "in light of this foundational Fourth Amendment case law."' 3 °
Exposing the danger created via Justice Scalia's opinion, Justice Breyer
emphasized that exclusion is paramount in deterring these violations,
reasoning that, although there may be an epidemic of violations in this
country, "the majority... failed to cite a single reported case in which a
plaintiff has collected more than nominal damages....'3 Without
definitive deterrence, the Fourth Amendment's protection of the home is
effectively eradicated, allowing police to come and go as they please and
placing civil rights on a dangerous path towards erosion.1
32
Rebuffing the majority further, Justice Breyer countered the
majority's assertion that exclusion is used as a last resort, 133 stressing that
the Court has only repudiated invocation of the exclusionary rule "where
there is a specific reason to believe that application of the rule would 'not
result in appreciable deterrence"",134  or "where admissibility in
proceedings other than criminal trials was at issue," two factors of little
relevance here. 35  In all other Fourth Amendment cases, the Court
upheld the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence.' 
36
Continuing his analysis, Justice Breyer took issue with the
majority's but-for causation analysis. 37  The dissent emphasized the
absurdity of separating the information gathered via a warrant's
execution from the manner in which the warrant is served. 38 Breyer
argued that because entry is a "necessary condition" of a search and
127. Id. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
128. See id. at 2171-73 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
129. See discussion supra Parts II.A-C.
130. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2173 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 2174 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
132. See id. at 2174-75 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 2163.
134. Id. at 2175 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Circumstances that would
"not result in appreciable deterrence" include situations where defective search warrants
are executed in good faith, where warrants include court-created clerical errors and where
the information garnered illegal is used to impeach false testimony. Id.
135. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Some of these exceptions include
parole revocation, deportation, civil tax, grand jury and federal habeas corpus
proceedings. Id. at 2175-76.
136. Id. at 2176 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
137. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
138. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2177 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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seizure, any "unlawful behavior inseparably characterizes" future
actions. 3 9 In this vein, he advocated that the marriage between the entry
and the subsequent search is constitutionally necessary and an important
part of the reasonableness doctrine that the Framers of the Constitution
engrained within the Fourth Amendment. 40 The purpose of the knock
and announce rule is the preservation of general privacy,141 not merely
the specific limited interests the majority espouses. 42  If the entry
constraints on law enforcement are repudiated, the Fourth Amendment,
the exclusionary rule and the privacy rights and protections afforded to
this country's citizens will be essentially neutered, validating
unreasonable searches and seizures.1
43
Finalizing the dissent, Breyer discounted Justice Scalia's
rationalizing the abuse of the knock and announce rule on the basis of
Segura,144 Harris 4' and Ramirez146 and noted that the rule is an integral
mechanism for isolating the Fourth Amendment and privacy concerns
from rogue police conduct. 
14 7
139. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
140. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995); see also Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at
2177-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that "a failure to comply with the knock-and-
announce rule, [is not] an independently unlawful event, but a factor that renders the
search 'constitutionally defective."'). This is especially poignant given the availability of
no-knock warrants. Id. at 2182 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
141. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2180 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142. See supra text accompanying note 100.
143. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2180-8 1. (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]he exclusionary
rule protects more general 'privacy values through deterrence of future police
misconduct."').
144. Although Segura involved an unlawful entry, the police merely secured the
entrance and immediately halted their progress. Id. at 2168 (citing Segura v. United
States, 468 U.S. 796, 800-01 (1984)); see also id. at 2171 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). They did not search the premises until a search warrant,
obtained through information independent of the entry, arrived a day later. Id. at 2168.
Unlike Hudson's situation, the unlawful entry was entirely separate from the search. Id.
at 2180-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
145. Harris' immateriality is largely founded upon the unlawful entry playing a
secondary role. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2184 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing New York
v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 16 (1990)); see also id. at 2171 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). Police illegally arrested an individual in his home who
later made multiple incriminating statements at the police station. Id. at 2184 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing Harris, 495 U.S. at 16). The question the Court addressed did not
focus on the entry, but the attenuated relationship between the stationhouse statements
and the arrest. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Harris, 495 U.S. at 20).
146. The plurality hedged its argument on the Court stating that "'destruction of
property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the
entry itself is lawful ... ' Hudson, 126 S. Ct at 2184 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998)). However, Hudson centered on an
unlawful entry, rendering Ramirez irrelevant. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
147. See id. at 2185-86.
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Ill. Analysis
The contentious atmosphere fostered by Fourth Amendment cases
clearly illustrates the possibility for law enforcement encroachment upon
the home. In light of Hudson, this possibility likely morphed into a
certainty. Although the future outcome of knock and announce cases is
now abundantly clear, the Hudson Court's sudden and dramatic decision
births significant questions that require answering. These questions
include: (1) How did Justice Alito's appointment affect the Court's
ultimate decision?; 148 (2) does Hudson signal a change in the manner
precedent will be treated by the Court?; 149 (3) did the majority properly
apply Fourth Amendment factors in reaching its determination?; 150 and
(4) what are the post-Hudson implications of the opinion?
151
A. Justice Alito's Swing Vote
With Justice O'Connor's retirement in early 2006, it was widely
assumed that Justice Alito's appointment signaled a distinctive
conservative shift in the Court's philosophy. 152 The Hudson decision
confirms this concern.
Though the Court was deadlocked at 4-4 when it initially heard
Hudson in January 2006, O'Connor, leaning towards voting with Justice
Breyer, asked "[i]s there no policy of protecting the home owner a little
bit and the sanctity of the home from this immediate entry?"' 53 This
attitude is certainly consistent with O'Connor's previous votes in knock
and announce cases, erring on the side of historical precedent and
maintaining that home entries should be paved upon the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness doctrine. 154 Perhaps the most powerful
reason to believe Justice O'Connor would have upheld the relationship
between the knock and announce and exclusionary rules is her well
known position as the Court's swing vote and pragmatic centrist,
generally favoring established Supreme Court precedent and
148. See infra Part III.A.
149. See infra Part III.B.
150. See infra Part III.C.
151. See infra Part hI.D.
152. Maura Reynolds, Attempt to Filibuster Alito Goes Nowhere, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31,
2006, at 15.
153. Gina Holland, Knock-and-Announce Rule is Dead, DAILY BREEZE, June 16,
2006, at A9.
154. See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) (holding that the knock and
announce rule falls under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness doctrine). However,
no-knock warrants, obtained reasonably, are valid in Justice O'Connor's opinion. United
States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 70-71 (1998).
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maintenance of the status quo. 55 With the court-sanctioned knock and
announce rule barely over ten years old at the time Hudson was decided,
and no evidence of a dramatic plague of evidence destruction in knock
and announce situations during that time, it is logical to assume that
Justice O'Connor, staying true to form, would have sided with Justice
Breyer's opinion and upheld evidence exclusion in knock and announce
violation cases.
The differences between Justice O'Connor's and Justice Alito's
jurisprudential approaches, particularly as they relate to personal
freedoms, are glaring. For example, a statistical analysis of O'Connor's
and Alito's voting records on "controversial issues" shows that Alito's
voting history is fifteen percent more conservative and sixteen percent
less liberal than O'Connor's voting background. 156 A Knight Ridder
study of over 300 Alito opinions demonstrates a clear pattern of law
enforcement support. 157  Justice Alito rarely invalidates convictions,
sentences5 8 or government searches, wishes to "relax warrant
requirements" and has argued in favor of expanding the types of searches
permissible via warrant. 159  Alito went so far as to uphold the
unwarranted strip search of a ten-year old girl incident to a warranted
home search because warrants "should be read 'broadly' '' 160 and
narcotics traffickers occasionally involve their children in their business
activities.161  Responding to this miscarriage of justice, fellow
conservative Michael Chertoff, the current Director of Homeland
Security and former Third Circuit Judge and colleague of Justice Alito,
stated that the search of the girl was blatantly illegal because police
should "rarely" exceed a warrant's explicit limitations.
1 62
In the rare instance Justice Alito declares a search unconstitutional;
it usually involves an absurd breech of the Fourth Amendment. For
example, in 1998, Alito overturned the search of an African-American
owner's vehicle because the government admitted racial profiling led
directly to the stop.1
63
Generally, however, Justice Alito supports government intrusions
155. E.g., Editorial, Whose Court is it Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2006, at A18.
156. Marcia Coyle, 'Hamdan, 'and the Rest: Presidential Power Case Overshadows a
Turbulent Year for the High Court, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 2, 2006, at 1.
157. Stephen Henderson & Howard Mintz, Alito's Opinions Present Clear Pattern:
Judge's Conservative Views Obvious; His Ideology is Less Clear, MIAMI HERALD, Dec.
4, 2005, at L1.
158. Id.
159. Stephen Henderson, Analysis Shows Alito Favors Authorities: Few Limits Placed
on Government's Searches, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 1, 2006, at A 19.
160. Henderson & Mintz, supra note 157, at Li.
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upon privacy.' 64  His conservative stance on searches and seizures
offends the boundaries established within mainstream America, drawing
the ire of his Third Circuit colleagues. 1
65
Consequently, Justice Alito's appointment and background signal
that Justice O'Connor's retirement drastically altered Hudson's outcome,
foreshadowing significant changes in American jurisprudence. 1
66
B. The United States-A Civil Law Society?
The Supreme Court's decision to abandon ten years of knock and
announce and over fifty years of exclusionary precedent fosters a
struggle between our common law history and the civil law systems
typically employed in Europe. Although there are obviously situations in
which the Court must revisit a point of law to rectify past sins (for
example, segregation in public schools), 167 the knock and announce rule
is hardly an example of a perpetuation of a grand offense against the
American people; nor does the provision fall into the same vein as
abortion or affirmative action, contentious issues that public groups
continue to demand the Court review. If anything, this instrument
prevents the government from unduly burdening its citizens by
protecting their privacy while remaining largely hidden from the media's
spotlight.
Even more confusing is the Court's reliance upon the judiciary's
supposed newfound respect of civil rights claims 168 to render precedent
obsolete. 169 Since Michigan admits that these cases almost never yield
more than nominal damages, and neither the federal government nor the
majority cites a case proving otherwise, 17 the Court's faith in civil
remedies amounts to little more than conjecture. Moreover, sans an
explanation of the significant developments between Hudson and Banks,
it is difficult to understand how the majority can disregard 800 years of
precedent 17 1 in such a cavalier manner. This is particularly troubling
considering the Court found such history unanimously compelling
164. See Henderson & Mintz, supra note 157, at Li.
165. See id. For example, taking exception to Justice Alito's consistent refusal to
provide judicial oversight in Fourth Amendment cases and his willingness to tax privacy
rights, Judge Theodore McKee chastised Alito's "Orwellian" views. Id.
166. See discussion infra Part III.C-D.
167. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
168. See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
169. See discussion infra Part III.C.3.d.
170. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2174 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing
Brief of Respondent at 35, n.66, Hudson v. Michigan, No. 04-1360 (Oct. 11, 2005)
[hereinafter Respondent's Brief]).
171. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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through Banks in 2003.172 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the
issues which called for evidence exclusion in past knock and announce
cases still remain in effect today. Does it qualify as adequate reasoning
to discount precedent or is the majority, with little evidence, assuming
these issues no longer pose a problem?
73
Though it seems oxymoronic, precedent abdication sets a precarious
model for future courts. Where the judiciary has normally paid
deference to past, well-reasoned decisions, Hudson now serves as a
dangerous example of the Supreme Court's willingness to ignore
precedential cases 174 and disavow ancient legal traditions with little or no
support.1 75 If the Court's new precedent is that no precedent is safe,
including those originating in the thirteenth century, written opinions
serve no purpose. Our common law judicial system is grounded in these
decisions; if legal practitioners cannot trust in their wisdom, how will our
legal system operate? At its most basic level, the American judiciary is
generally "grounded in logic, in history, in precedent, and in empirical
fact." 17 6 If the very courts meant to uphold these principles disregard
them at a whim, the problems caused by one knock and announce case
will rank as a mere inconvenience in comparison to losing our judicial
identity.
Inevitably, the conflict between judicial activism and the common
law system must reach an apex. If the Court fails to condemn precedent
rejection, the country is left with a legal system blurring the lines
between common and civil law, a scheme the United States, except for
Louisiana, has found unappealing since its inception.
1 77
C. Hudson Criticisms
I. But-for Causation and the Inevitable Discovery Rule
The majority claims that the exclusionary rule should not apply in
knock and announce cases because the evidence would have been
discovered pursuant to the legal execution of a search warrant.1 78 For
172. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 32 (2003).
173. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167 ("As far as we know, civil liability is an effective
deterrent here, as we have assumed in other contexts.").
174. See id. at 2186-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing forty-one cases since 1914
sanctioning evidence suppression as a result of illegal home searches).
175. See id. at 2171-72, 2175 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Editorial, No-knock
Ruling Worrisome, DENVER POST, June 26, 2006, at B7.
176. Id. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
177. See William A. Hilyerd, Using the Law Library: A Guide for Educators-Part I:
Untangling the Legal System, 33 J. L. & EDUC. 213, 219-20 (2004).
178. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2164-65.
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this evaluation to be accurate, the majority would have to rewrite the
definition of but-for causation. Plainly stated, the but-for cause of an
event is an action without which the event would not have occurred.
179
Therefore, the unlawful entry of the Hudson home is directly
responsible for the discovery of any incriminating evidence. The entry
cannot be separated from the search because the police would not have
found themselves in the position to conduct the search had they not
unlawfully entered the residence; a search cannot go forth if the police
are not inside the home. 80 Separating the illegal entry from the search
merely because the police hold a valid search warrant is the equivalent of
barring the prosecution of an individual for purchasing a controlled
substance because the purchaser possesses a prescription for that
substance. As Justice Brennan once eloquently stated, "lawful entry is
the indispensable predicate of a reasonable search."' 81 Analyzing how
the police could act, as opposed to how they actually conducted
themselves, extends already dangerous ex post facto justifications
beyond actual facts to theoretical possibilities.
The majority's claim is implicitly grounded in the inevitable
discovery doctrine.' 82 However, the application of the but-for principle
is misguided. The Nix Court reasoned that evidence is admissible "if it
inevitably would have been discovered in the same condition by an
independent line of investigation that was already being pursued when
the constitutional violation occurred.' ' 183 Based upon the independent
source exception,' 84 this premise suggests that the discovery must be
made in conjunction with a separate, distinct and lawful police action.
185
In Segura and Murray, cases the plurality relied upon, the Court
upheld warranted searches, which followed illegal searches, because the
warrants were not obtained with any information related to the unlawful
searches. 86  In contrast, the evidence admitted in Hudson directly
contradicts this interpretation. Unlike Segura and Murray, Hudson did
179. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
180. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2177 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
181. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 53 (1963) (Brennan, J., joining in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1921)).
182. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
183. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,459 (1984) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see id at 443.
184. Id. at 443-44; see Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539 (1988).
Establishing the principles underlying the inevitable discovery rule, the independent
source exception allows the government to admit evidence initially discovered illegally if
the government substantiates its knowledge of the evidence from an independent, legal
source. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
185. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2178 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Murray, 487
U.S. at 541; Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 814 (1984); Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at
392.
186. Murray, 487 U.S. at 535-36, 542; Segura, 468 U.S. at 813-15.
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not involve a second search based upon independently collected
information.' 87 Instead, the evidence was the fruit of the only warrant
proffered, one tainted by illegal entry.188
Describing the warrant execution in Hudson as a distinct line of
investigation would be excessively unfair to the defendant and an
ostensible common sense violation. A warranted search is predicated
upon attaining the warrant itself. Thus, its execution is a subsidiary,
related act which must occur legally to avoid triggering the exclusionary
rule, 189  not a casually-connected, independent and legal police
investigation or action. 90 Holding otherwise would ignore the precepts
of search warrants, split the process' steps far too finely and discount that
"the [illegal] method of entry vitiate[s] the ... evidence seized in the
subsequent search....
Arguably, the Court reaffirmed this premise three months prior to
Hudson.192  Suppressing evidence seized in conjunction with a home
search, to which one tenant acquiesced and another objected, 193 the Court
held that although the search was illegal, the defendant's co-tenant could
have legally provided the police with the evidence in question or
information that would have resulted in a search warrant. 194  The
Randolph analysis debilitates the Hudson majority's but-for/inevitable
discovery argument because the Randolph Court suppressed evidence
that was clearly discoverable via other constitutional means.195
Moreover, the inevitable discovery doctrine is designed to operate
in situations where authorities do not have the luxury to contemplate
whether the evidence will be eventually discovered.' 9 6 Considering the
187. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2178 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
188. See id.
189. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (stating that evidence
seized as a result of an unlawful entry is "no less the 'fruit' of official illegality" than
evidence obtained pursuant to an unwarranted search).
190. The Court's determination that entry is directly related to the subsequent search
is of paramount importance in the case at bar. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S.
585, 586-88 (1968) (holding that violation of the knock and announce rule renders the
entry and subsequent activity within the home illegal, thereby requiring the evidence
exclusion); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 302-04 (1958) (concluding that an
illegal entry rendered the subsequent arrest and home search unlawful); see also Wong
Sun, 371 U.S. at 485 (holding that the exclusionary rule bars evidence discovered "during
or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion" from use at trial).
191. Sabbath, 391 U.S. at 586.
192. See Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).
193. Id. at 1519.
194. Id. at 1524 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 441,487-89 (1971)).
195. See id. at 1530 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that the authorities could have
easily obtained a warrant permitting the search) (citing Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S.
326, 331-32 (2001)); see also id. at 1542-43 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
196. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445 (1984).
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amount of time, effort and manpower' 97 it takes to obtain a search
warrant, plan a raid, establish a perimeter around the home and storm the
residence, the Court could hardly declare that police officers possessing a
search warrant did not have adequate time to consider whether the
evidence they would seize via an unlawful entry could be obtained
similarly during a search incident to a legal entry. Therefore, Hudson
qualifies as an arbitrary implementation of the inevitable discovery rule,
mocking its use in legitimate cases.
Hudson's but-for analysis also perilously establishes inequities in
favor of government authorities over its citizens. If unlawfully obtained
evidence is freely admissible, the government has carte blanche authority
to violate the Fourth Amendment. Essentially, after violating the knock
and announce provision, the police may simply state that they would
have located the same evidence a few moments later had they acted
legally, thereby obfuscating the Constitution. This not only defies the
government's duty to prevent unlawful acts, but also overlooks the Nix
Court's independent investigation requirement and its definitive assertion
that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not sanction government
delinquency. 198 Hudson inappropriately renders the Fourth Amendment
vestigial, relegating it to a suggestion, instead of a binding foundation of
American freedom.
2. The Exclusionary and Knock and Announce Rules-Too
Attenuated?
Throughout the Fourth Amendment's history, the Court typically
limited its review of possible violations to whether an unconstitutional
search resulted in the discovery of evidence. 199 In departing from this
pattern, and alluding to the weakness of its inevitable discovery
argument, the majority stated that although an illegal entry may qualify
as the but-for cause of a search, the interests the knock and announce
requirement protects are too "attenuated" from those served through
197. The raid on Hudson's home was planned and conducted by seven police officers.
Petitioner's Brief, supra note 7, at 2.
198. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 445-46 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 288, 297 (1971)). The Nix Court stated:
When an officer is aware that the evidence will inevitably be discovered, he
will try to avoid in engaging in any questionable practice. In that situation,
there will be little to gain from taking any dubious 'shortcuts' to obtain the
evidence. Significant disincentives to obtaining evidence illegally.., also
lessen the likelihood that the ultimate or inevitable discovery exception will
promote police misconduct.
Id.
199. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2181 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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evidence suppression. 20 0 This capricious contention was founded on the
idea that the knock and announce rule was designed to safeguard life,
property and "the elements of privacy.., that can be destroyed by
sudden entrance," not foil government investigations.2
This elucidation of the knock and announce rule drastically
misinterprets the rule's relationship to the Fourth Amendment. At its
heart, the Fourth Amendment is dedicated to guaranteeing American
citizens freedom from unreasonable governmental interference into their
private lives.2°2 This liberty is championed through the exclusionary
rule, which deters law enforcement from illegally encroaching upon
privacy by barring the use of any evidence discovered via an unlawful
search.20 3  With the knock and announce rule's constitutional
formalization in Wilson, the Court linked the rule to the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness clause 204 and, by proxy, the Constitution's
general privacy guarantee. Therefore, Wilson undoubtedly stands for the
proposition that an unreasonable entry, absent exigent circumstances,
20 5
violates the Fourth Amendment privacy protections enshrined within the
exclusionary and knock and announce rules.
How can the majority legitimately excise the knock and announce
rule from the exclusionary rule's bosom when the Court held that
exclusion applies to all unreasonable government invasions of the home
and "the privacies of life?, 20 6 If evidence exclusion is essential to
preserving privacy norms,20 7 and the knock and announce rule is as
indispensable to that consideration as the warrant requirement,20 8 the
majority's decision to divorce the two nullifies the universal democratic
principle that "a man's home is his castle. 20 9
In continuing abdication of established legal principles, Hudson
separates the Fourth Amendment's privacy doctrine from its subsidiary
rules by construing "attenuation" differently from the Court's
traditionally accepted definition. 210  Hudson's tragedy lies, as Justice
200. Id. at 2164-65.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 100-103.
202. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390-91 (1914).
203. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 319 (1990) (stating that the exclusionary rule
limits illegal government actions, thereby ensuring privacy); see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655-56 (1961); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 390-93.
204. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995).
205. See id. at 935-936.
206. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391.
207. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656.
208. See Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1523 (2006) (citing Wilson v. Layne,
526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99 (1998)).
209. Goddard, supra note 17.
210. Generally, the Court acknowledged "attenuation" to mean that evidence was
discovered independently of or in a significant time period following an illegal
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Breyer rightfully noted, in the majority's willingness to impulsively
fabricate an incongruous definition while simultaneously ignoring the
judiciary's consistent suppression of evidence incident to unlawful
searches. 21  Although Justice Scalia was quite correct in stating that the
knock and announce rule is not meant to impede legitimate government
searches,212 he fails to recognize its purpose. In conjunction with the
exclusionary rule, the knock and announce rule is designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment privacy interests by neutralizing the incentives law
enforcement has to violate those interests. 213 The disrespect displayed
for these Fourth Amendment standards should cease immediately, lest
the American people wake to discover the amendment has become too
"attenuated" from their privacy concerns. 214
3. The Deterrence Seesaw-Social Costs vs. Benefits
Historically, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has held the
exclusionary rule requisite in preventing unauthorized law enforcement
acts.21 5 The Hudson decision, however, ignored this dogmatic legal
canon.216  Instead, the Court favored a comparison between the
deterrence benefits associated with exclusion and the costs thrust upon
society as a result of losing probative evidence.1 7 In light of alternative
remedies, the majority held that the social costs associated with the
knock and announce-exclusionary marriage far outweighed its deterrent
benefits.21 8
a. Knock and Announce-A Burden to the Courts?
Justice Scalia noted that maintaining the knock and announce status
quo would continue to encourage a litigation deluge alleging
government act. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2180 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). In Hudson, however, Justice Scalia sculpted the definition to satisfy his own
needs, holding that "attenuation" referred to suppression's failure to advocate the knock
and announce rule's principles. See id.
211. See id. at 2180-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 2165.
213. See id. at 2179-80 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
214. See id. at 2181 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
215. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (stating that the purpose of
exclusion is "to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (holding that without the exclusionary rule the Fourth
Amendment "might as well be stricken from the Constitution").
216. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2173-2177, 2180 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
217. See supra text accompanying note 104.
218. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165-68.
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violations. 21 9 At best, this assertion represents a circuitous attack upon
the venue in which knock and announce violations are remedied, not the
rule itself, that Scalia fails to support with any factual basis. At worst, it
is an over exaggeration 220 that exemplifies the importance that criminal
courts hold in disqualifying improperly obtained evidence. Fourth
Amendment cases normally teeter on whether the police secured consent
to search 221 or were reasonably suspicious that violence or evidence
destruction would occur. 22  Therefore, it is logical to believe that
frivolous allegations can be dealt with expediently, leaving cases which
warrant further investigation.-- Consequently, barring exclusion does a
great disservice to those with reasonable qualms about police
misconduct, especially considering the Court could easily attack any
other Fourth Amendment protection on this basis in the future,224 an
unsettling possibility when one examines the fervor with which the Court
departed from the Fourth Amendment and castrated the knock and
announce rule in Hudson.
Further, if the majority is correctly evaluating the burden that knock
and announce cases levy upon the court system and is confident in the
alleged police professionalism epidemic,225 should there not be evidence
of a significant decline in misconduct allegations? Perhaps more
importantly, is it not reasonable to assume that the courts are more
equipped to quickly separate frivolous and legitimate claims as a result
of heightened police conduct standards? After all, with police
conforming to stricter guidelines, the distinction between illegal and
lawful conduct should be less distorted. In actuality, Justice Scalia's
claims should have led to a noticeable reduction in the Fourth
Amendment traffic the courts encounter, not a "constant flood of
alleg[ations]...., 226 Today, the litigation decrease that Scalia searched
for will almost certainly occur, at least in the criminal sector, thanks to
law enforcement's freedom to violate the knock and announce rule
without fear of reprisal.
219. Id. at 2165.
220. Paul Levmore & William J. Stuntz, Remedies and Incentives in Private and
Public Law: A Comparative Essay, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 483, 491 (concluding that the
exclusionary rule does not burden the court system because the rule's elements inherently
influence all proceedings).
221. See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1519 (2006).
222. See, e.g., United States v. Richards, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997).
223. See Levmore & Stuntz, supra note 220.
224. See RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS:
PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES 19 (1985) (stating that most searches are
conduct sans warrants).
225. See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2168 (2006); see also discussion infra
Part III.C.3.e.
226. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166.
[Vol. 112:1
WHO CARES IF IT'S OPEN?
b. A Violation of Our Most Hallowed Values
The United States has long exemplified a nation dedicated to the
preservation of its citizens' freedom from government oppression.
However, the Hudson majority interfered with this distinction when it
determined that suppressing probative evidence is an overdeterrence,
generally amounting to a "get-out-of-jail free card." '227 Not only does
this ill-conceived proposition play on the lowest denominator of our
personalities, our fears, but it also displays Justice Scalia's willingness to
conveniently disregard mores that serve as the backbone of the American
criminal justice system. Stressing that evidence suppression releases
dangerous criminals onto our streets, the Court overlooks the timeless
legal adage that it is better one hundred guilty men go free than one
innocent man be persecuted. 28  While wrongful incarceration is
presumably more dangerous than unlawful entry into a home, they are
not so dissimilar as to render the point moot.
According to the Declaration of Independence, the citizens of the
United States are entitled to "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of
Happiness., 229 This sense of liberty is multi-faceted, exhibiting both the
belief that innocence trumps other considerations and that there can be
no freedom without personal liberties, including privacy. In order to
"secure the Blessings of Liberty, 230 the aforementioned adage should
apply to unlawful searches. If legal doctrine bestows upon people the
responsibility to accept that the guilty must go free to protect the
innocent, it stands to reason that the judiciary must allow for the
suppression of illegally obtained evidence. Although suppression
prevents the successful prosecution of an unknown number of guilty
offenders, it is necessary to protect not only the innocent, but also the
concepts of freedom on which this country was founded.
c. Violence Prevention or Escalation?
There is little doubt that warrant execution is one of the most
dangerous duties a police officer undertakes on a daily basis.
2 3'
Regardless of the painstaking preparation involved in planning raids,
there are a significant number of unknowns that police must account for
when entering a residence. 32 Concerned with the possibility of violence,
227. Id.
228. E.g., John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney-New
Answers to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REV. 293,336 (1980).
229. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
230. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
231. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976).
232. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 392-393 (1997).
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the Hudson decision stated that the exclusionary rule's relationship with
the knock and announce requirement forces police to delay entrance,
thereby fostering "preventable violence. 233
However, the majority neglected to proffer any evidence illustrating
the knock and announce rule's detrimental effect upon either police or
resident safety.234 In contrast, Cato Institute policy analyst Radley
Balko's recent study of paramilitary law enforcement practices
summarized over seventy cases, following the Wilson decision in 1995,
in which police mistakenly stormed the incorrect residence,235 subjecting
innocent residents to raids likened to "terrorist attacks. 236  Balko,
alluding to the knock and announce rule's necessity, noted that a study of
Denver, Colorado law enforcement activity indicated that police were
incorrect 80% of the time they believed firearms would be present at a
residence.237 This statistic acknowledges that, in many cases, the danger
the majority purports that the knock and announce rule creates is
marginal, and that the danger the majority refers to acts as a "red
herring," distracting the public from unconstitutional law enforcement
activity and concealing the threat no-knock entries pose to human life.
Inevitably, Hudson will result in significant police and civilian
casualties. For example, Kathryn Johnston, an elderly Atlanta woman
frightened of her drug-infested neighborhood, turned her home into a
fortress and purchased a handgun for protection.238 Searching for a
perpetrator in November 2006, the police conducted a no-knock raid
upon Johnston's residence.239  Fearing for her life, she opened fire,
wounding three officers.240 Ms. Johnston was killed in the process.241 In
an equally tragic case, Cory Maye was convicted of murdering a
Mississippi police officer when the police conducted a no-knock raid on
242the wrong home. Assuming intruders were entering his home to attack
him and his daughter, Maye fired, killing an officer.243 Essentially,
Hudson diverted this country in a conspicuous direction, one in which its
233. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2166 (2006).
234. See id; see also id. at 2181-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
235. RADLEY BALKO, OVERKILL: THE RISE OF PARAMILITARY POLICE RAIDS IN
AMERICA 43-63 (2006); Cathy Young, Op-Ed, Knocking on Door to Trouble, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 26, 2006, at A11.
236. BALKO, supra note 235, at 5.
237. Id. at 24-25.
238. See Patrik Jonsson, After Atlanta Raid Tragedy, New Scrutiny of Police Tactics:
Police are Reviewing their use of 'No-Knock' Warrants After an Octogenarian was
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citizens are now in the "unimaginable predicament" of "decid[ing] if the
intruders are cops or criminals, and whether to confront them or succumb
to them. .. Should the resident make a poor decision either way, the
death toll could be staggering.
d. An Erroneous Solution: Civil Remedies as a Deterrent
Technically, federal and state governments have provided
alternative remedies to civil rights violations for over sixty years.14' The
majority accurately explains, however, that these remedies, and
specifically § 1983 suits,2 46 were not readily available for Fourth
Amendment cases until after the Court extended the exclusionary rule's
scope to include state cases in Mapp.247 In fact, the Court did not expand
§ 1983 to include situations similar to the one at bar until 1971, for
federal law enforcement actions, 248 and 1978, for state and municipal law
enforcement actions,2 49 respectively. Although these represented
progressive steps, it is evident that § 1983 was seldom useful for
redressing Fourth Amendment violations.
250
Hudson contends that recent developments make it far more likely
defendants will achieve success via § 1983 suits. 251 Paving this notion,
the Court stated that legislation 252 now permits defendants to recover
attorney's costs and places faith in the judiciary's willingness to allow
suits to progress unimpeded by qualified immunity claims.
253
Though this argument strikes an optimistic tone, unfortunately, the
254majority stipulates that it is founded on little more than assumption.
Justice Breyer correctly demonstrated that even the Respondent,
neglecting to illustrate a single instance where a plaintiff recovered
244. Radley Balko, Hudson ... , The Agitator, http://www.theagitator.com/archives/
2006_06.php (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).
245. See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2167 (2006).
246. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
247. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at2167.
248. Id. (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)).
249. Id. (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978)).
250. Id. at 2174-75 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
251. See id. at 2167. The irony of Justice Scalia's decision to overturn the knock and
announce rule is that it counteracts his desire to limit litigation costs. Without an
exclusionary remedy, residents will be forced to turn to the civil court system, a venue
which incurs significantly higher costs per trial than its criminal counterpart. See
Levmore & Stuntz, supra note 220. This opinion was especially daring in the absence of
Fourth Amendment precedent allowing for the removal of the exclusionary rule in favor
of civil remedies.
252. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006).
253. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167-68 (citations omitted).
254. See id.
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anything in excess of nominal damages, freely admitted the probability
that a similar case would produce damages was miniscule. 255  Thus,
Justice Scalia's insistence that civil claims provide adequate deterrence
against knock and announce violations radically departs from the
foundation of the United States legal system, fact-based decisions, and
ventures into the realm of unfounded speculation.256
Moreover, the plaintiffs ability to recover attorney's costs is
seriously limited if the plaintiff was convicted following the violation.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), attorney's fees are
limited to 150% of actual damages in prisoner-filed actions.257
Considering that actual damages will rarely exceed nominal values, or
the cost of the door,258 it is unreasonable to assume civil rights actions
are viable options for many plaintiffs.
These plaintiffs will face a burdensome stigma. Under § 1983,
convictions qualify as admissible evidence in civil rights suits. 259 What
is the realistic probability that the average citizen will find fault in a law
enforcement action that resulted in a conviction? What is the likelihood
a juror will understand the ramifications of sanctioning unlawful police
activity? The answer to each of these questions is "slim-to-none."
Although a jury may occasionally find fault with police action, damages
are still severely limited under the PLRA. 260 As a result of the PLRA's
255. Id. at 2174 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Respondent's Brief, supra note 170).
Michigan further conceded that immunities bar tort from adequately redressing Fourth
Amendment violations. Id.
256. Id. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
257. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2006).
258. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 170. According to Lowe's and Home Depot,
entry doors typically range from approximately $115 to $500. See Lowes.com, Entry
Doors,http://www.lowes.com/lowes/lkn?action=productAccess&referurl=productList
%26No%3D%26Ne%3D8000%26N%3D0+5000033%26category%3DInterior+Doos
(last visited Jan.24, 2007); Homedepot.com, Doors, http://www.homedepot.com/
webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/Navigation?categorylD=500921 &storeld=10051 &catalogId=l
0053&langld=-1&onlineStore=true (last visited Jan. 24, 2007). Given the time and effort
constitutionally-based lawsuits require (or any lawsuit for that matter), it is reasonable to
conclude that a willing party would find it incredibly difficult to obtain adequate legal
counsel. See Justice Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1388 (1983) (stating that "damage actions arc... expensive, time-
consuming, not readily available, and rarcly successful.").
259. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also FED. R. EvIo. 403; FED. R. EvID. 404.
260. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). For example, if the police break down a $500 door,
the PLRA would limit the conviction's total cost to $1250, the sum of actual damages
and attorney's costs (150% of actual damages). See id. In circumstances similar to
Hudson's, a $1 nominal damage award would prevent the total cost from exceeding
$2.50. See id. Prior to Hudson, this deterrent would have served a more effective
purpose because convictions were consistently overturned. See Hudson v. Michigan, 126
S. Ct. 2159, 2176 (2006) (discussing that the Court has overturned every conviction
incident to a Fourth Amendment violation since Mapp). Therefore, a significant number
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control over prisoner civil suits and the stigma accompanying a
conviction, it is economically and logistically sensible for the police to
consciously violate the knock and announce rule to obtain a conviction.
Summarily, unless the plaintiff avoided conviction, it is impractical to
believe that civil suits will deter future violations.
On the off-chance the plaintiffs case is viable and the possible
damages surpass a cursory amount, the plaintiff must scale another legal
obstacle, qualified immunity.2 6 1  While the majority is confident that
qualified immunity is no longer an issue,262 recent cases indicate that, at
the very least, the courts have yet to reach a consensus.263 Additionally,
state laws generally isolate law enforcement officers from liability. 264 If
plaintiffs are unable to bring suit, even to make a political statement, this
mechanism serves almost no purpose in deterring the authorities from
unlawfully desecrating the sanctity of the home, a notion the Mapp Court
stressed over sixty years ago.265 Inevitably, these factors lead to an
inauspicious conclusion; civil suits will not consistently deter knock and
announce violations.266
of plaintiffs would have had the opportunity to recover reasonable attorney's fees. See 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b). Following Hudson and the PLRA's implementation, a symbiotic
inverse relationship exists in which the exponential increase in convictions will
accompany a related decrease in attorney fee expenditures. These factors considerably
reduce the number and quality of the attorneys who would contemplate trying such a
case. Where a conviction is not an issue, the only party with additional motivation to file
suit is the attorney, who stands to recover reasonable costs not limited via the PLRA. See
id. Plaintiffs, however, would still face only a modest recovery. See Respondent's Brief,
supra note 170.
261. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2177 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 252-253.
263. See, e.g., Johnson v. Deep E. Tex. Reg'I Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379
F.3d 293, 305 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that law enforcement officers will enjoy qualified
immunity from damages in § 1983 suits if reasonable officers would disagree about the
legality of a no-knock entry). But see, e.g., Green v. Butler, 420 F.3d 689, 700-01 (7th
Cir. 2005) (denying qualified immunity in a knock and announce § 1983 suit). If the
Court insists upon maintaining the Hudson decision, it should strongly consider visiting
this circuit split.
264. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1407(2)(c) (2006).
265. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961) (discussing the exclusionary rule's
essential nature in light of the inadequacy of all other Fourth Amendment remedies).
266. What remains to be answered is why the Court adopted the knock and announce
rule in the first place. Reasonable attorney's fees were available to § 1983 plaintiffs as
early as 1976. See Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641
(1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)). If civil suits are capable of
preventing knock and announce violations today, that ability should have existed in 1995
when Wilson was decided. Somehow, the Court failed to explain the difference in the
civil suits circa 1995 and those filed today.
20071
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
e. A Subsidiary Trend: The Increase in Police Professionalism
In addition to the civil remedies it advocates, the Hudson Court
claimed that "increasing professionalism of police forces, including a
new emphasis on internal police discipline" over the last fifty years,
dissuades authorities from violating civil rights.267 Relying upon a study
conducted by criminologist Samuel Walker, Justice Scalia deemed that
the exclusionary rule was no longer necessary to address knock and
announce issues thanks to "wide-ranging reforms in the education,
training, and supervision of police officers. 268
Taking great exception to this characterization and describing the
use of his work in this manner as "a serious offense," Walker stressed
that "[Justice Scalia] twisted [the] main argument to reach a conclusion
the exact opposite of what [was] spelled out in this and other studies.,
269
In actuality, Walker's argument illustrates that any increase in
professionalism was the direct result of the exclusionary rule and the
pressure it exerted upon law enforcement to conform its procedures to
Fourth Amendment requirements.70 Concluding to the contrary is as
illogical as discontinuing birth control use following a reduction in teen
pregnancy.
Arguably, in an age when paramilitary police actions are steadily
rising,271 it is important to understand that increases in police
professionalism do not call for the knock and announce rule's
dissolution, but "reinforce the Supreme Court's continuing importance in
defining constitutional protections for individual rights and requiring the
appropriate remedies for violations, including the exclusion of
evidence.,272  Otherwise, post-Mapp progress will likely spiral
downward around itself, resurrecting the vicious cycle of Fourth
Amendment violations that required the Court to formalize Weeks and
Mapp in the first place. Unfortunately, Hudson represents the beginning
of this chain reaction, a warning sign for things to come.
D. Post-Hudson Implications
Following the decision, courts expanded upon the principles
267. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2168 (2006).
268. Id. (quoting SAMUEL E. WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF
DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950-1990 51 (1993)).
269. Samuel Walker, Op-Ed, Scalia Twisted My Words, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2006, at
5.
270. See id.
271. See John Tierney, The SWAT Syndrome, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2006, at A17; see
also Young, supra note 235, at A11.
272. Walker, supra note 269, at 5.
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outlined within Hudson rather quickly.273 The real concern, however, is
that Hudson initiated a movement that will inevitably result in
abandoning the exclusionary rule in its entirety. The arguments the
majority adopts in Hudson are equally applicable to all other Fourth
Amendment cases, especially in light of the majority's distaste for
factual evidence.274 If civil suits adequately deter police from violating
the knock and announce rule, is it not reasonable to believe the Court
would also find they deter unwarranted searches? Would the Court not
also be correct in lamenting the number of criminals set free under the
other Fourth Amendment protections? Does "increasing [police]
professionalism" not also prevent other violations? 275 The protections
outlined within the Amendment, and the violations thereof, all involve
unlawful searches, seizures or both to some degree.276 Obviously, these
similarities, in conjunction with Hudson, pave a convenient path for the
Court to follow the next time it targets the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Scalia's willingness to obfuscate the exclusionary rule
regardless of its deterrent properties is certainly disconcerting.277
Equally troublesome, his belief that Mapp forces the public to "pay for
the sins and inadequacies of a legal regime that existed almost half a
century ago, 278 fails to instill confidence in the exclusionary rule's
continual survival, especially when one takes into account his unfettered
faith in civil suits and "internal police discipline" to protect one of our
most sacred rights.279 If Mapp is obsolete, then the exclusionary rule
merely represents an unnecessary burden upon the criminal court system,
one which Justice Scalia clearly believes would be treated differently
today.28 °
The only cause for relief is Justice Kennedy's assurance that "the
continued operation of the exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by
our precedents, is not in doubt.",28' However, this statement is difficult to
reconcile with Kennedy's support of the portions of Scalia's opinion that
273. See, e.g., United States v. Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194, 201 (1st Cir. 2006) (expanding
Hudson to include arrest warrant execution); United States v. Southerland, 466 F.3d
1083, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (concluding that Hudson applies equally to knock and
announce violations of 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2006)).
274. See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2174-76 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
275. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2168 (2006).
276. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated .... ).
277. See id. at 2166 (stating even if "as Hudson contends, that without suppression
there will be no deterrence ... it would not necessarily justify suppression.").
278. Id. at 2167.
279. See id. at 2167-68.
280. See id. at 2163-64, 2167-68.
281. Id. at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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essentially describe Mapp as an outdated, inapplicable anomaly. 282
Taken together with the systematic erosion of the exclusionary rule over
283the past thirty years, this confusion only confirms two things: (1) the
exclusionary rule is in grave danger; and (2) should either Justice
Kennedy or one of the dissenting Justices leave the bench during this
administration, one that publicly supported unwarranted wiretapping,
284
the rule will inch closer to its demise. Nevertheless, as it stands now, the
conflict between Justice Kennedy's statement and his vote simply
prohibits an accurate prediction of how the current Court would treat the
exclusionary rule.
IV. Conclusion
From its birth, America has defended the sanctity of the home,
guaranteeing its citizens freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures through the Fourth Amendment. There is little doubt the knock
and announce rule comprises a vital piece of these fundamental
protections. As Mapp decorously illustrated, no means, absent evidence
exclusion, is capable of shielding these rights from unlawful government
interference.285 Displacing these protections mocks the Constitution, an
action no judicial court should undertake. Unfortunately, Justice
Breyer's dissent accurately delineated the dangers Americans and these
protections face in Hudson's wake.
Abdicating 800 years of protective precedent, Hudson permits
authorities to violate our most hallowed sanctuaries. The walls of our
homes guard the memories we hold dear. We retire there to escape life's
tribulations. The privacy of our homes provides us the opportunity to
raise our children, celebrate religious sacraments and holidays, plan
romantic evenings with our spouses and grieve devastating losses. It is
the one location, above all others, that should remain free from
unreasonable government intrusions.
Although Hudson technically preserves the knock and announce
rule, it does so in name only, stripping the protection of any viable effect
and setting privacy rights back nearly a millennium in the process. The
judicial restraint traditionally displayed in Fourth Amendment cases has
degraded, leaving the exclusionary rule's future in doubt. Hudson's
repercussions could be both far reaching and devastating. Have civil
282. See id. at 2167-68.
283. See Martin A. Schwartz, Knock-and-Announce Violation Nixed, N.Y.L.J., Oct.
10, 2006, at 3, 3 (enumerating the steps taken to limited the exclusionary rule since
1969).
284. E.g., Eric Lichtblau, Administration and Critics, in Senate Testimony, Clash
Over Eavesdropping Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2006, at A2 1.
285. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961).
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actions and faith in police professionalism replaced constitutional
review? Are the American people at the mercy of their police forces?
Does this signal the end of the exclusionary rule? A year ago this would
have been unspeakable, now the public can only hope the Fourth
Amendment is not relegated to a mere "form of words. 2 86
Founding Father Benjamin Franklin asserted that "[t]hose who
would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety,
deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. 287 Arguably, that is exactly what the
Supreme Court advocates in Hudson. The lone recourse is to hope the
Court realizes its error and addresses this dire situation before the Fourth
Amendment and more American lives are irreparably damaged.
286. Id. at 655.
287. Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor (Nov. 11,
1755), in 6 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, at 242 (Leonard W. Labaree ed.) (1963).
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